"Eminent historian of economics Elmus Wicker examines the events which spurred a series of banking panics beginning in 1893-94, that led to the creation of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank twenty years later. A serious lacuna exists in the literature on the origins of the Federal Reserve System. What is absent is a fair appraisal of the role Senator Nelson Aldrich, prominent Rhode Island senator, played. Carter Glass captured the acclaim while asserting that Aldrich be granted equal billing with Glass as "fathers" of the Federal Reserve System."--BOOK JACKET.
"Eminent historian of economics Elmus Wicker examines the events which spurred a series of banking panics beginning in 1893-94, that led to the creation of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank twenty years later.
Author: Elmus Wicker
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Category: Business & Economics
The Need for Constitution Reform Rodney D. Scott ... Generally this is done
through a centralized banking system . ... body James Laurence Laughlin with
the support of the New York City banking interest pressed the issue of banking
Author: Rodney D. Scott
Category: Constitutional law
Readers are introduced to the people and policies involved in debates of the Jacksonian era.
Instead he remained focused on banking reform . Happy that the nation ' s
revenues were no longer going to the BUS , he was alarmed at the speculative
frenzy that accompanied the change . Gambling on future federal deposits ,
Author: Paul E. Doutrich
A tour de force of historical reportage, America’s Bank illuminates the tumultuous era and remarkable personalities that spurred the unlikely birth of America’s modern central bank, the Federal Reserve. Today, the Fed is the bedrock of the financial landscape, yet the fight to create it was so protracted and divisive that it seems a small miracle that it was ever established. For nearly a century, America, alone among developed nations, refused to consider any central or organizing agency in its financial system. Americans’ mistrust of big government and of big banks—a legacy of the country’s Jeffersonian, small-government traditions—was so widespread that modernizing reform was deemed impossible. Each bank was left to stand on its own, with no central reserve or lender of last resort. The real-world consequences of this chaotic and provincial system were frequent financial panics, bank runs, money shortages, and depressions. By the first decade of the twentieth century, it had become plain that the outmoded banking system was ill equipped to finance America’s burgeoning industry. But political will for reform was lacking. It took an economic meltdown, a high-level tour of Europe, and—improbably—a conspiratorial effort by vilified captains of Wall Street to overcome popular resistance. Finally, in 1913, Congress conceived a federalist and quintessentially American solution to the conflict that had divided bankers, farmers, populists, and ordinary Americans, and enacted the landmark Federal Reserve Act. Roger Lowenstein—acclaimed financial journalist and bestselling author of When Genius Failed and The End of Wall Street—tells the drama-laden story of how America created the Federal Reserve, thereby taking its first steps onto the world stage as a global financial power. America’s Bank showcases Lowenstein at his very finest: illuminating complex financial and political issues with striking clarity, infusing the debates of our past with all the gripping immediacy of today, and painting unforgettable portraits of Gilded Age bankers, presidents, and politicians. Lowenstein focuses on the four men at the heart of the struggle to create the Federal Reserve. These were Paul Warburg, a refined, German-born financier, recently relocated to New York, who was horrified by the primitive condition of America’s finances; Rhode Island’s Nelson W. Aldrich, the reigning power broker in the U.S. Senate and an archetypal Gilded Age legislator; Carter Glass, the ambitious, if then little-known, Virginia congressman who chaired the House Banking Committee at a crucial moment of political transition; and President Woodrow Wilson, the academician-turned-progressive-politician who forced Glass to reconcile his deep-seated differences with bankers and accept the principle (anathema to southern Democrats) of federal control. Weaving together a raucous era in American politics with a storied financial crisis and intrigue at the highest levels of Washington and Wall Street, Lowenstein brings the beginnings of one of the country’s most crucial institutions to vivid and unforgettable life. Readers of this gripping historical narrative will wonder whether they’re reading about one hundred years ago or the still-seething conflicts that mark our discussions of banking and politics today.
The Region (publication of Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), May 1989.
tension arose: Warburg Narration 1; and ... Elmus Wicker, The Great Debate on
Banking Reform: Nelson Aldrich and the Origins of the Fed (Columbus: Ohio
Author: Roger Lowenstein
Category: Business & Economics
A basic feature of the modern US administrative state taken for granted by legal scholars but neglected by political scientists and historians is its strong judiciality. Formal, or court-like, adjudication was the primary method of first-order agency policy making during the first half of the twentieth century. Even today, most US administrative agencies hire administrative law judges and other adjudicators conducting hearings using formal procedures autonomously from the agency head. No other industrialized democracy has even come close to experiencing the systematic state judicialization that took place in the United States. Why did the American administrative state become highly judicialized, rather than developing a more efficiency-oriented Weberian bureaucracy? Legal scholars argue that lawyers as a profession imposed the judicial procedures they were the most familiar with on agencies. But this explanation fails to show why the judicialization took place only in the United States at the time it did. Okayama demonstrates that the American institutional combination of common law and the presidential system favored policy implementation through formal procedures by autonomous agencies and that it induced the creation and development of independent regulatory commissions explicitly modeled after courts from the late nineteenth century. These commissions judicialized the state not only through their proliferation but also through the diffusion of their formal procedures to executive agencies over the next half century, which led to a highly fairness-oriented administrative state.
the central banking system could be established at all and took the form it did has
been provided. ... 1863–1923 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974); Elmus
Wicker, The Great Debate on Banking Reform: Nelson Aldrich and the Origins of
Author: Hiroshi Okayama
Paul J. Kubik, ”Federal Reserve Policy during the Great Depression: The Impact
of Interwar Attitudes regarding ... The Great Debate on Banking Reform: Nelson
Aldrich and the Origins of the Fed Ohio State University Press, 2005. • Wood ...
In Money and Banks in the American Political System, debates over financial politics are woven into the political fabric of the state and contemporary conceptions of the American dream. The author argues that the political sources of instability in finance derive from the nexus between market innovation and regulatory arbitrage. This book explores monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies within a political culture characterized by the separation of business and state, and mistrust of the concentration of power in any one political or economic institution. The bureaucratic arrangements among the branches of government, the Federal Reserve, executive agencies, and government sponsored enterprises incentivize agencies to compete for budgets, resources, governing authority and personnel.
As the two systems grew in tandem, state and national banks were chartered and
supervised at different levels, with two ... 3“ Elmus Wicker, The Great Debate on
Banking Reform: Nelson 44 Money and Banks in the American Political System.
Author: Kathryn C. Lavelle
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Category: Political Science
TO HEAR EXPERTS ON BANK REFORM service , for the support of these great
classes is essential to the creation of such widespread public sentiment as ... TO
DEBATE BANK REFORM MONETARY SCLEROSIS ( New York Evening Sun. ) ...
( World Bank Operations Evaluation Department OED series ) Includes
bibliographical references . ( HC60 . H2645 2005 ] 22 ... 1 ' 1 ' 0973 The great
debate on banking reform : Nelson Aldrich and the origins of the Fed / Elmus
Wicker . Ist ed .
Category: American literature
This work presents a comprehensive history and evaluation of the role of the 100 percent reserve plan in the banking legislation of the New Deal reform era from its inception in 1933 to its re-emergence in the current financial reform debate in the US.
This work presents a comprehensive history and evaluation of the role of the 100 percent reserve plan in the banking legislation of the New Deal reform era from its inception in 1933 to its re-emergence in the current financial reform ...
Author: Ronnie J. Phillips
Category: Business & Economics
However, he was successful, because there was in office at the time a governor
of the bank, and also in power a government, ... in the world, the idea being that
debates will bring out the good and bad points of any measure, but I find that the
greatest orator in the ... I am not the only one who is pressing for financial reform.
Author: Australia. Parliament
Contributed articles; felicitation volume in honor of M.C. Vaish, a former head of the Dept. of Economics, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
... of U . S . dollars into gold , added impetus to the great debate about the reforms
of the international monetary system . ... system through which IMF interferes in
the affairs of different countries when they approached for financial assistance to
Category: Banks and banking
Category: Bank management
He had been Librarian of the Banks Library and Herbarium from 1810 to 1827 ,
and when it was transferred to the British ... for consideration , and because the
reform of its Constitution and Government , if such reform was required , would of
Author: Nancy Brault
Publisher: Los Angeles : School of Library Service, University of California
He told IBAA members that there is a great difference between the regulation of
banks and securities houses , noting that ... counselor to the president for
domestic policy , told the IBAA there will be more debate on banking reform either
Category: Banking law
Government Orders ( 1725 ) For those just joining us , this is a bill concerning
bank reform . Bank reform is connected with democracy , and with our conception
of equal opportunity . Mr. John Herron : Madam Speaker , I think the hon .
Author: Canada. Parliament. House of Commons
Debate Texas University ... the danger of Wall Street controlling the Association is
too distinct to be denied , while the powers of such a centralized financial
monopoly are too great to be exercised by nine men . ... Laughlin ' s Banking
Author: Texas University
Category: Banks and banking
With respect to the debt crisis , Ron MacKinnon observed a few years ago that if
we distinguished banks that engage in ... Now , of course , you have a big
overhang of empty buildings . MR . ... KRUEGER : There was a big debate about
Author: Elliot Berg
Publisher: Sequoia Inst
Category: Business & Economics
August 1996 The institutional capacity of banks in transition economies improves faster when a new or parallel private banking system is allowed to emerge than it does when the government tries simply to reform existing state-owned banks. Banking reform should stress decentralized institution-building and penalties for weak banks. In reforming the financial sector in transition economies, one important debate is about whether governments should try to reform existing state-owned banks -- the rehabilitation approach -- or whether a new private banking system should be allowed to emerge -- a new entry approach. Or should there be a mix of the two approaches, in which the activities of state banks are restricted while a parallel private banking system develops? Claessens's cross-country comparison of banks' institutional development in 25 transition economies suggests that progress can be faster under the new entry approach, especially relative to initial conditions. Progress under the rehabilitation approach appears to be inhibited by poor incentives. In most countries, even those with a good banking infrastructure and a large segment of good banks, a two-track process has evolved, with large and growing differences between weak and strong banks. Whatever the banking reform approach taken, weak banks have moved very little beyond central planning. Regression estimates suggest that in transition economies three things are associated with slow progress of weak banks: overconcentration, preferential treatment by governments, and limited entry for new banks. The direction of causality is often unclear. Policies and structural conditions can affect bank quality, but whenever a banking system has a certain quality, particular policies may also arise or structures exist. The role of banks will remain limited in many transition economies because of weak legal infrastructures, much uncertainty and inside information, and problems associated with highly leveraged financial intermediaries -- including fraud, political interference, and implicit guarantees. In the short run, self-finance and intermediation among enterprises and through nonbank financial institutions may prevail. This paper -- a product of the Office of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics -- was written as a background paper for World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market.
Claessens's cross-country comparison of banks' institutional development in 25 transition economies suggests that progress can be faster under the new entry approach, especially relative to initial conditions.
Author: Stijn Claessens